



SECTION 1: The Argument of Self-Concern
Raymond Martin’s Self-Concern (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998)1 sets out to put the debate around personal identity on to
a new footing. He acknowledges the ground-breaking work of Derek
Parfit which shifted the general focus from questions of strict identity
to the question of what it is that really should matter in survival, but
he thinks the focus should shift further than just this. His book sets
out to endorse ‘a shift in the philosophical debate from the normative
question of whether this or that should matter in survival to the largely
descriptive question of what … actually does or might be brought to
matter’ (x).
The roots of his objection to the new orthodoxy represented by
Parfit are methodological. Since Locke began the debate on what
makes someone the same person over time, almost all philosophers
who have got involved have made use of thought-experiments to
establish their view and to challenge those of their rivals. Parfit is no
exception. Indeed, his major contribution – the move from a focus on
identity to a focus on egoistic survival values – was based entirely on
one of these ‘puzzle cases’. In the thought-experiment he called ‘My
Division’, Parfit imagined himself being split into two distinct people
(Parfit 1984: 254). In such a case, the logic of identity rules that nei-
ther of these two resulting people could be Parfit, and yet (Parfit
argued) their relationships to the original person contain all that mat-
ters in survival. His conclusion was that identity could not be what
matters in survival, and that we should rather concern ourselves with
what does matter. Martin agrees that survival values and not identity
should be our central focus, but disagrees with Parfit’s way of estab-
lishing this. He is not out to follow Kathleen Wilkes in rejecting all
thought-experiments of this kind (Wilkes 1988: chapter 1), but he
does think that this method cannot establish what we should value –
in the sense of what is rationally required, as Parfit wants it to – but
only what actually matters to particular individuals. And besides,
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Parfit’s case is too vulnerable to counter-attack. Martin acknowledges
Peter Unger’s charge that it will be preferable that I survive, rather
than two people physically and psychologically continuous with me.
Martin’s alternative route to survival values as the focus is a
thought-experiment he calls ‘Fission Rejuvenation’ (53-54). John,
who undergoes fission rejuvenation is a healthy twenty-year-old with
prospects of a long and happy life. Under suitable hospital condi-
tions, his brain is removed from his body and divided into two func-
tionally equivalent halves (as in Parfit’s original case, the possibility
of this is claimed to follow from the ability of actual stroke victims to
recover all their psychology with only half an operative brain). A
microcomputer together with a radio transmitter is attached to the
one half and a corresponding receiver and microcomputer to the other
half. Each half is then placed into a new body qualitatively identical
to John’s old one. A, the body with the transmitter, undergoes a period
of recuperation after which he emerges just as John was before the
operation except that he knows of the operation and of the existence
of his doppelgänger. B is kept unconscious, and his body in a state of
unaging limbo. The computer in A’s brain continually scans and trans-
mits the information there, and the receiving computer in B’s brain
alters it accordingly so that B’s brain, apart from being unconscious,
is in the same state as A’s. Thirty years later, A dies of a heart attack.
At that instant, a signal is sent to B’s brain which activates it and B
then goes through the same recuperation process A did before. B
emerges with a body just like John’s but psychologically just like A,
and then continues to live and age in the normal way.
As was the case with Parfit’s thought-experiment, the presence of
duplicates (even if one is unconscious for the period of their simulta-
neous existence) militates against either of them being identical with
John. The difference which Martin wishes to highlight is that John
(and people who share his values) can quite rationally choose to
undergo fission rejuvenation rather than to continue as the same per-
son – on the grounds that continuing in this way will be preferable to
normal survival. And so, contra Unger, strict survival does not always
trump other ways of continuing; or, to put it the old way, identity is
not always what matters. Parfit’s aim has been fulfilled, but as part of
a new and achievable programme. I will return to these issues in detail
in Section 2.
The preference for fission rejuvenation over normal survival with
identity is not the only way in which survival values might be
revealed or induced to change. Martin also argues that many people
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would prefer to transform into the person they would rather be (or,
better, would most like to be) than to persist, should the technology
be available to bring this about. That is, they would prefer to undergo
psychological or physical reshaping such that we could no longer call
them the same person (under the standard accounts of same person)
because of the desirable psychological or physical features the result-
ing person would have rather than to carry on as they are and thus
retain identity. They would trade off identity for these features,
reflecting again that identity is not all that matters to people. Martin
argues that this would be a rational trade-off from the original per-
son’s point of view as long as they could ‘rationally fully identify’
with the person they would become – that is, as long as they can
rationally anticipate having the resulting person’s experiences and
performing their actions, even though they know it will not be them
doing so.
There are thus a number of hypothetical situations in which people
might, given their egoistic survival values, rationally have ‘identifi-
catory surrogates’. That is, says Martin, ‘at least at the level of theo-
retical belief, our so-called egoistic survival values are, at bottom, not
really egoistic at all but, rather, at most, “continueristic”’ (94). Many
of us are rationally more concerned to continue than to survive. The
next question is what determines how we discriminate between those
‘others’ who are and are not appropriate surrogates for ourselves.
Martin is at pains to point out that this is an empirical question, and
not the sort of question that philosophers interested in personal iden-
tity have typically bothered about – as opposed to philosophers inter-
ested in the more obviously cognitive parts of philosophy of mind
(94-5). The answer will come from psychology, not metaphysics.
Martin’s answer (though unnervingly based in armchair thought [95-
124], given this introduction) is that there is no objective source for
our decision. It lies rather in our subjective relations to others. The
continuers you regard as appropriate surrogates are those to whom
you direct dispositions you would normally only direct to yourself
(127) – those who you feel are and treat as yourself, even if you know
they are not. They must be ‘close-enough’ continuers in salient
dimensions, though.
In the final chapter, he offers his explanation of why our self-
regarding dispositions will take others as their objects in certain hypo-
thetical situations while they usually are only directed on ourselves.
He suggests the explanation lies in a peculiar – and illusory – feature
of our experience. Part of any normal experience of yours is a sense
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(a feeling) that there is a hidden perceiver in the experience, although
it is not one of the objects of the experience, and a sense that this per-
ceiver is you. You take the hidden perceiver to be a self – a fixed, sta-
ble, continuous observer and this is the illusory feature. Ever since
Hume, philosophers have realised that there is no such thing to be
found. Martin points out that in esoteric ‘no-self ’ experiences as
reported by meditators like Krishnamurti, and some of our more com-
mon sensually overwhelming experiences this ‘perceiver-self phe-
nomenon’ is missing. Krishnamurti’s claim that the self is an illusion
has a basis in these experiences, rather than in the sort of theoretical
considerations of Hume.
Nevertheless, the phenomenon is a striking feature of most of our
experiences and it is the ‘self’ as experienced in this way that we pro-
ject (probably unconsciously) into the experiences of the person we
are hypothesising to emerge after the operation of a brain-state-trans-
fer device, teletransporter, fission rejuvenator, or whatever (145). And
it is here that the answer to why we either do or do not identify our-
selves with our hypothetical continuers is to be found. Our self-
regarding dispositions can be moved from ourselves to take others as
their objects because it is only at a theoretical level that we regard
them as others. At the experiential level, where the perceiver-self phe-
nomenon occurs, we may well regard them as ourselves – we may
have a ‘quasi-belief’ to this effect. It is at this level that what really
matters is to be found. Our egoistic survival values may well be based
on an illusion, then. We will not be able to remove this illusion from
our experience, but we must realise that it may encourage us to have
false beliefs about our identity – as was the case with the belief that
identity is what matters first and foremost.
SECTION 2: A Response
Martin does not claim to be offering a new substantial account of
what matters (x). The claim he does press strongly for his book is that
he is laying the grounds for approaching the topic in a new way, and
that the old way represented by Parfit is inadequate. It is these claims
that will be my focus. I wish to argue that his new way is not signifi-
cantly different from the old, and that his criticism of Parfit’s method
is anyway inadequate to make us want to change.
Martin is sympathetic to much of what Parfit had to say. He cites
Parfit as the philosopher who showed him the way to his own contri-
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bution to the debate (x). He lauds what I have outlined as the crucial
conclusion Parfit drew from My Division: that identity is not what
matters in survival. But, as outlined in Section 1, he has two central
complaints concerning Parfit’s handling of the whole issue. First, he
feels that Parfit’s argument in support of this conclusion is far too vul-
nerable to counterattack, and suggests what he sees as a preferable
means to the same end. Second, he believes that Parfit shifts the
debate in a mistaken manner in the light of this important conclusion.
I will come back to the first complaint; here the second, potentially
more devastating one, needs further explanation.
Parfit’s breakthrough was the claim that identity is not what mat-
ters in survival. Our concern should then be to argue not about strict
identity, but rather about what does matter in survival. This is where
Martin wants his path to diverge from Parfit’s. He contends that the
method of thought-experiment which Parfit employs can only support
conclusions about what does actually matter to people. It is just a fact
that different people respond differently to the puzzle cases philoso-
phers like Parfit outline. Thus we can use them to investigate what
matters to a particular individual – but the method cannot support
conclusions about what ought rationally matter to everyone, and that
is what Parfit sets out to establish:
He thinks he can show that all of us should value just psychological con-
nections between ourselves now and people in the future. Unger too is in
this tradition. He thinks he can show that all of us should value certain
sorts of physical connections between ourselves now and people in the
future. (63)
Martin calls this quest which is at odds with its own method survival-
value imperialism. In its place he sets himself the more humble task
of clarifying and ultimately perhaps transforming our basic egoistic
survival values (30), and suggests that this is what the personal iden-
tity debate should now take as its focus.
Despite this statement of intent, it is not at all clear that the debate
does change significantly in Martin’s hands. What does happen is
that the claims he makes in response to the thought-experiments he
runs come with the qualifiers, ‘for most of us’, or ‘for many’. Rather
than concluding in the light of a thought-experiment that we do not
believe that continuity of the same brain is necessary for our sur-
vival, Martin would conclude that most of us do not believe this. What
he does not do is to indulge in empirical research to discover how
many people think what, but instead defends what it would be ratio-
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nal for many people to think. As a result, the game seems strikingly
similar to what it was before. This impression is reinforced by the fact
that in a number of places, even these qualifiers are dropped, and the
arguments sound exactly like they did in the old days. Consider the
discussion as to whether or not the organs that sustain our psycholo-
gies have a derivative value as a result of doing so (80-81). Martin
describes a scenario in which it is discovered that your psychology
has functioned on only half of your brain, and that that half is dis-
eased and will soon cease to function. But with a quick and simple
procedure your psychology can be switched into the other half with
no resultant complications. He asks how much it would matter to you
that the original brain half was no longer doing the work. His conclu-
sion: ‘So much for the derivative value of the organs that have actu-
ally sustained our psychologies’ (81). Just in case that does not strike
you as the claim of a survival-value imperialist, he continues in a
way which is to all intents and purposes typical of such a thinker. He
outlines how ‘those who are skeptical of this response’ might react,
and argues why they would be wrong. Only at the very end of the
argument (82) do we find a ‘most people’ slipped in, far too late to be
playing any significant role in the case. Those used to the old debate
can feel quite at home here.
Martin’s complaint against Parfit’s ‘My Division’ in particular is
that it is vulnerable to the criticism that it does not succeed in showing
that there may be ways of continuing that are almost as good as (strict)
survival. He points to the challenges along these lines made by Unger
and Ernest Sosa. Unger, for instance, contends that ‘no case that lacks
strict survival will be as good as any case in which the original person
himself does survive’ (Unger 1990: 211-2). This contention has imme-
diate plausibility – faced with a case of yourself undergoing fission, it
does seem preferable if only one offshoot survives. While Parfit’s case
is open to this challenge, Martin believes his ‘Fission Rejuvenation’ is
not (as well as not being guilty of imperialism).
That, at any rate, is how Martin would have us understand things.
We need to take a more careful look at some of the steps he takes,
however, before we rush to join his cause. Perhaps the place to start is
his criticism of Parfit’s case as vulnerable to attacks like Unger’s. In
the first place, Unger does not really set out in the role in which Mar-
tin casts him of attempting to re-instate identity as what matters. He
points out that some people hold that identity does not matter at all in
survival while at the other extreme some hold that identity is all that
matters. His claim that cases of strict survival (i.e. identity) are always
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preferable to those that lack it is a way of stating his own ‘realistic
compromise view of what matters’ (Unger 1990: 211). It is worth
noting that he distances himself from the view that identity is all that
matters, because that serves to remind us what Parfit’s fission argu-
ment was all about – about showing that this ‘strict view of what mat-
ters’ (to borrow Unger’s phrase) is wrong.
The way in which Martin uses Unger to criticise My Division
makes us lose sight of Parfit’s quarry, which was the nonreductionist –
one who believes that personal identity is a simple relation which can-
not be reduced to some more familiar relation like physical or psycho-
logical continuity. Parfit set up My Division as an attack on the view
that it is identity alone which matters, which he sees as a pillar of
nonreductionism – the two doctrines ‘stand or fall together’ (1984:
216). Parfit thus intended to show that nonreductionism is wrong in
claiming solely that ‘what is judged to be important … is whether …
there will be someone living who will be me’ (1984: 215). That this
can sometimes be important is neither here nor there in Parfit’s attempt
to show that it is not all-important and in that way to strike a blow
against nonreductionism.2 But that identity can sometimes be impor-
tant is all that Unger’s claim implies, and thus that this can be said
against Parfit’s thought-experiment should hardly be a cause for worry.
This pushes us to the next step, which is to consider whether Fis-
sion Rejuvenation is really a better way than My Division of showing
that identity is not what matters, as Martin claims it to be (56). Con-
sider first what Fission Rejuvenation is in a position to show us given
Martin’s strictures on the limits of thought-experiment. Since thought-
experiments can only reveal what matters to individuals and others
who happen to share their values, the best that Fission Rejuvenation
can show is that identity is not actually important to everyone. It may
nevertheless be rationally all-important to you if you are not like John
or Raymond Martin in not sharing their survival values and thus react-
ing differently with regard to whether continuing as A and then B
would be preferable to being just John.
Now consider what My Division is in a position to show us. On the
way to getting an understanding of this, what immediately stands out
is that the argument in which it is placed has a form very different
from that of Fission Rejuvenation. It will be worth taking a brief look
at how Parfit actually presents the case. He outlines the hypothetical
scenario first:
My Division. My body is fatally injured as are the brains of my two broth-
ers. My brain is divided, and each half is successfully transplanted into the
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body of one of my brothers. Each of the resulting people believes he is
me, seems to remember living my life, has my character, and is in every
other way psychologically continuous with me. And he has a body that is
very like mine. (Parfit 1984: 254)
Following this, he asks what can be said about what happens to him.
‘There are only four possibilities: (1) I do not survive; (2) I survive as
one of the two people; (3) I survive as the other; (4) I survive as both’
(1984: 256). He then argues that there are strong objections to each of
these descriptions, and yet they are the only options for the nonre-
ductionist to whom identity is always what matters. ‘On the reduc-
tionist view, the problem disappears. On this view, … these claims are
merely different descriptions of the same outcome’ (1984: 259).
In this argument we are not faced with a choice between which of
two outcomes we find best fits our survival values. The point of his
thought-experiment is not to draw forth an answer to the question of
whether you would rather continue as you are or split into two. The
point is rather to illustrate some fundamental tensions – tensions
between the assumption that identity is what is at issue and some fun-
damental (logical and other) principles. On the assumption that iden-
tity is what is at issue, we are obliged to offer one of the four
descriptions of what has happened to him which Parfit outlines. The
problem is that (4) conflicts with the principle of the necessity of
identity (one thing cannot be two), (2) and (3) conflict with the prin-
ciple that identity cannot be an arbitrary matter, and the last with the
principle that ‘a double success cannot be a failure’. (This last may
not strike you as a fundamental logical principle. But there is a con-
flict with one of these lurking in Parfit’s discussion of the problem
with this description. It conflicts with the principle of the intrinsic
nature of identity – the principle that who you are cannot depend on
whether or not somebody else exists). These principles are not a mat-
ter of subjective survival values; they are fundamental in the sense
that to give them up would have devastating consequences for the
basics of logic and metaphysics amongst other things.
My point is that My Division is not an intuition-pump for produc-
ing your survival values. It is rather a reductio of the assumption that
identity is the crucial issue in the debate. While not going the whole
way of showing that assumption to lead to contradiction, it sets out to
show that the costs of accepting it are too high in terms of the princi-
ples we must reject in order to retain it. Of course, this does not dis-
prove it once and for all – we can (for theoretical reasons) choose to
pay those costs and reject those principles as the Duhem-Quine thesis
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reminds us.3 But that choice is not at all like the one Martin’s thought-
experiment offers, as discussed above. Martin’s thought-experiment is
of the kind he describes in rejecting the method of thought-experiment
as a way to reaching general conclusions. As a result, My Division is
in a position to show us much more than Fission Rejuvenation can –
it can show all of us that identity need not be the only issue when it
comes to questions of survival. And this all suggests that Martin’s
charge of survival-value imperialism is quite out of place in this par-
ticular context. It is also worth noting that, working as a reductio, the
thought-experiment is not open to the worries that Martin’s claim that
our intuitions about ourselves may have an illusory base might raise.
Martin has indeed brought aspects of our experience not normally
discussed by analytic philosophers into the central debate concerning
personal identity. Krishnamurti is certainly a name not found in bib-
liographies in the literature. Nevertheless, my argument is that the
claims for novelty which his book makes so strongly are not nearly as
well-founded as one would desire.
NOTES
1. Raymond Martin, Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to What Matters in
Survival, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. All page references are
to this work unless otherwise indicated.
2. Parfit openly acknowledges that identity can sometimes be important (1984:
263-4).
3. Parfit himself ends up in rejecting one of the principles involved – the intrinsic-
ness of identity – because he argues that all plausible accounts of our identity
will conflict with it (1984: 266-273). But that is not part of the argument under
discussion, and the principle is certainly one that those who believe that identity
is what matters would believe to be also a fundamental principle.
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